On the normative status of mixed strategies

Flipping a coin to decide what to do is a common feature of everyday life. Mixed strategies, as these are called, have a thorny status in normative decision theories. This paper explores various ways to justify choosing one's actions at random. I conclude that it is hard to make sense of this behavior without dealing with some difficult consequences

On the normative status of mixed strategies

Flipping a coin to decide what to do is a common feature of everyday life. Mixed strategies, as these are called, have a thorny status in normative decision theories. This paper explores various ways to justify choosing one's actions at random. I conclude that it is hard to make sense of this behavior without dealing with some difficult consequences

On the normative status of mixed strategies

Flipping a coin to decide what to do is a common feature of everyday life. Mixed strategies, as these are called, have a thorny status in normative decision theories. This paper explores various ways to justify choosing one's actions at random. I conclude that it is hard to make sense of this behavior without dealing with some difficult consequences

The Computational Philosophy: Simulation as a Core Philosophical Method

Modeling and computer simulations, we claim, should be considered core philosophical methods. More precisely, we will defend two theses. First, philosophers should use simulations for many of the same reasons we currently use thought experiments. In fact, simulations are superior to thought experiments in achieving some philosophical goals. Second, devising and coding computational models instill good philosophical habits of mind. Throughout the paper, we respond to the often implicit objection that computer modeling is "not philosophical.

The Scientific Ponzi Scheme

Fraud and misleading research represent serious impediments to scientific progress. We must uncover the causes of fraud in order to understand how science functions and in order to develop strategies for combating epistemically detrimental behavior. This paper investigates how the incentive to commit fraud is enhanced by the structure of the scientific reward system. Science is an "accumulation process:" success begets resources which begets more success. Through a simplified mathematical model, I argue that this cyclic relationship enhances the appeal of fraud and makes combating it extremely difficult

The theory of games as a tool for the social epistemologist

Traditionally, epistemologists have distinguished between epistemic and pragmatic goals. In so doing, they presume that much of game theory is irrelevant to epistemic enterprises. I will show that this is a mistake. Even if we restrict attention to purely epistemic motivations, members of epistemic groups will face a multitude of strategic choices. I illustrate several contexts where individuals who are concerned solely with the discovery of truth will nonetheless face difficult game theoretic problems. Examples of purely epistemic coordination problems and social dilemmas will be presented. These show that there is a far deeper connection between economics and epistemology than previous appreciated

Signals without teleology

"Signals" are a conceptual apparatus in many scientific disciplines. Biologists inquire about the evolution of signals, economists talk about the signaling function of purchases and prices, and philosophers discuss the conditions under which signals acquire meaning. However, little attention has been paid to what is a signal. This paper is an attempt to fill this gap with a definition of signal that avoids reference to form or purpose. Along the way we introduce novel notions of "information revealing" and "information concealing" moves in games. In the end, our account offers an alternative to teleological accounts of communication

Signals without teleology

"Signals" are a conceptual apparatus in many scientific disciplines. Biologists inquire about the evolution of signals, economists talk about the signaling function of purchases and prices, and philosophers discuss the conditions under which signals acquire meaning. However, little attention has been paid to what is a signal. This paper is an attempt to fill this gap with a definition of signal that avoids reference to form or purpose. Along the way we introduce novel notions of "information revealing" and "information concealing" moves in games. In the end, our account offers an alternative to teleological accounts of communication

Invariance and Symmetry in Evolutionary Dynamics

The concept of fitness is central to evolutionary biology. Models of evolutionary change typically use some quantity called “fitness” which measures an organism’s reproductive success. But what exactly does it mean that fitness is such a measure? In what follows, we look at the interplay between abstract evolutionary models and quantitative measures of fitness and develop a measurement-theoretic perspective on fitness in order to explore what makes certain measures of fitness significant